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NOTES
Education-Board of Education v. Rowley: The Supreme Court
Takes a Conservative Approach to the Education of
Handicapped Children
Amy Rowley was born deaf in 1972. In 1975, Congress passed P.L. 94-
142, the Education for All Handicapped Children Act,1 which guarantees all
handicapped children a "free appropriate public education"' 2 and establishes
procedural safeguards for its implementation. The Act became effective on
October 1, 1977. Amy began her public school education that fall. Five years
later she became the subject of the first case in which the United States
Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of free appropriate public education
and considered the scope of judicial review under the Act.
3
To understand Board of Education v. Rowley, a basic understanding of the
Act is important. The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975
was enacted in response to growing recognition of the rights of handicapped
children to an appropriate education.4 Congress began employing funding
measures to encourage education of the handicapped as early as 1966,5 but it
I. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461
(1976 & Supp. V 1981).
2. It is the purpose of this Act to assure that all handicapped children have available to
them... a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and
related services designed to meet their unique needs, to assure that the rights of handi-
capped children and their parents or guardians are protected, to assist States and locali-
ties to provide for the education of all handicapped children, and to assess and assure the
effectiveness of efforts to educate handicapped children.
20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (Supp. V 1981). Free appropriate public education (FAPE) is defined at 20
U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1976). See infra text accompanying note 65.
3. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982).
4. Congress found that of the eight million handicapped children in the United States, only
3.9 million received appropriate education, while one million were completely excluded. 20
U.S.C. § 1400(b) (Supp. V 1981); S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in 1975 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1425, 1432; see also H.R. Rep. No. 332,94th Cong., Ist Sess. 2-3 (1975).
5. In that year Congress passed the Elementary and Secondary Education Amendments of
1966, Pub. L. No. 89-750, § 161, 80 Stat. 1191, 1204 (replaced 1970) (amending Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27), which added title VI, estab-
lished the Bureau for Education and Training of the Handicapped, and funded programs to aid
education of the handicapped. In 1970, title VI was replaced by the Education of the Handi-
capped Act, a grant program to assist state plans for handicapped education. Pub. L. No. 91-230,
§§ 601-662, 84 Stat. 175-88 (1970), amendedby Education for All Handicapped Children Act, Pub.
L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461 (1976 & Supp.
V 1981)). In 1973, Congress passed § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, broad civil rights
legislation requiring that states which accept federal funds for education follow educational poli-
cies that do not violate the equal protection or due process clauses of the Constitution. Pub. L.
No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (1973) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). For a
statutory history of P.L. 94-142, see generally Comment, The Least Restrictive Environment Section
of the Educationfor 411 Handicapped Children Act o(1975: A Legislative History and an Anaysis,
13 GONz. L. REv. 717, 761-67 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Comment, 4 Legislative History].
The road to this recognition was long and arduous. In 1917, Merritt Beattie, a child with
cerebral palsy, was not allowed to return to sixth grade in a Wisconsin public school. The Wis-
consin Supreme Court upheld his exclusion on the basis that his rights must be subordinated to
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was only after judicial recognition of a "right" to equal education 6 that Con-
gress followed the lead of a number of states7 and passed P.L. 94-142. 8
The first major judicial affirmation of a right to education for the handi-
capped came in Pennsylvania Associationfor Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania
(PARC),9 a class action on behalf of mentally retarded children who, under
Pennsylvania law, had been excluded from public schools as "uneducable or
untrainable."' 0 A three-judge federal panel approved a consent decree in
which the parties agreed that all mentally retarded children are capable of
benefiting from some form of education or training. 1 The state recognized
the right to a free public education and agreed to place each mentally retarded
child in a "free, public program of education and training appropriate to the
child's capacity."' 2 Because the label "mentally retarded" carries with it a
serious stigma, the court also suggested that the children might be guaranteed
due process protection before being so classified. 13
those of the other schoolchildren, whom he bothered. State ex rel Beattie v. Board of Educ., 169
Wis. 231, 233-34, 172 N.W. 153, 154 (1919); see Blakely, Judicial and Legisladve 4ttitudes Toward
the Right to an Equal Educationfor the Handicapped, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 603, 603-05 (1979); see also
Watson v. City of Cambridge, 157 Mass. 561, 32 N.E. 864 (1893). Cf. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200,
207 (1927) (statement by Justice Holmes that "[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough" to
justify sterilizing a mentally retarded woman).
For historical discussions of handicapped education, see Burgdorf & Burgdorf, ,4 History of
Unequal Treatment: The Qual#fcations of Handicapped Persons as a "Suspect Class" Under the
Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 855 (1975); Comment, 4 Legislative History,
supra, at 74246; Comment, Historical Overview: From Charity to Rights, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 953
(1977).
For specific problems encountered by the deaf, see generally Large, Special Problems of the
Deaf Under the Educationfor Al Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 213 (1980).
6. In 1954, the United States Supreme Court first declared school segregation unconstitu-
tional and recognized the right of blacks to an equal education. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954). Similar rights for the handicapped were judicially recognized in Pennsylvania
Ass'n for Retarded Children (PARC) v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972), mod#.-
ing 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), and in Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C.
1972). See infra text accompanying notes 9-23.
7. In 1971, only 7 states had mandatory education legislation protecting all handicapped
children while 26 others required education of certain classes of the handicapped. H.R. REP. No.
332, supra note 4, at 10.
After P4RC and Mills, most states enacted laws guaranteeing educational rights to the handi-capped. See S. REP. No. 168, supra note 4, at 20-21 table 2,reprintedin 1975 U.S. CODa CONe. &
AD. NEws 1425, 1444-45 table 2. The Massachusetts statute, MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 71B
(Michie/Law. Co-op. 1978 & Supp. 1982), was supposedly the drafting model for Pub. L. No. 94-
142. 121 CONG. REc. 37,029 (1975) (statement of Rep. Conte).
8. In 1974, Congress passed Pub. L. No. 93-380 as an emergency interim measure until Pub.
L. No. 94-142 could be finalized. Education of the Handicapped Amendments of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-380, §§ 611-621, 88 Stat. 579-85 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (Supp. V 1975))
(amended 1975) (amending Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 121
(1970)). See Comment, 4 Legislative History, supra note 5, at 763-66.
9. 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972), modfying 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971). There
had been earlier less publicized cases upholding a similar right. See, e.g., Wolf v. Legislature of
Utah, Civ. No. 182646 (3d Judicial Circuit, Salt Lake County, Utah Jan. 8, 1969) (since education
is so important to the development of children, and Utah's policy is that the state and not the
family should bear its cost, trainable mentally retarded children have a right to a free public
education).
10. Id at 312.
11. Id at 307.
12. Id
13. Id at 293-95. The court applied the logic of Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433
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The gains made by the mentally retarded in PARC were extended to all
handicapped children in Mills v. Board of Education.14 In Mills the school
system regularly excluded certain handicapped children, using the justification
that the school lacked funds to provide proper evaluation, personnel, and serv-
ice. The court held that no child could be excluded from public schools unless
an adequate alternative was provided and proper procedural safeguards were
followed. 15 Because inadequacies of school funding could not "be permitted to
bear more heavily on the 'exceptional' or handicapped child than on the nor-
mal child,"'16 the school district was ordered to provide each child of school
age "a free and suitable publicly supported education regardless of the degree
of the child's mental, physical or emotional disability or impairment."'
17
PARC and Mills provided strong impetus for P.L. 94-142.18 The decisions
were also important in convincing Congress that there was in fact a constitu-
tional right to education for the handicapped, 19 and influenced Congress' for-
mulation of the Act.20 This influence is reflected in the Act's emphasis on
Individualized Educational Programs 2 ' within the least restrictive environ-
(197 1), to reason that since posting someone as an habitual drunk required due process, by alleg-
ing that children were being labelled "mentally retarded," plaintiffs had established a claim of due
process violation sufficient to give the court jurisdiction. 343 F. Supp. at 295. But ef. Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (state action that tends to defame or degrade an individual's reputation
is not an interference with a liberty or property interest protected by the due process clause); San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (education is not a fundamental right
of the type triggering strict scrutiny).
Because PARC was a consent decree, the issues were not adjudicated. PARC's precedential
value, therefore, is theoretically limited, although it is often cited and followed. See infra note 19.
14. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
15. Id at 876, 878 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1969)).
16. Id at 876.
17. Id at 878.
18. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct. 3034, 3043 (1982) (quoting S. REP. No. 168, supra
note 4, at 6, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1425, 1435);see Note, The Education
of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 10 U. MICH J.L. REF. 110, 119 (1976).
19. In a 1973 case involving interdistrict disparities in educational spending based on prop-
erty taxation, the Supreme Court rejected arguments that children from property-poor school dis-
tricts formed a suspect class and that education was a fundamental right. San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodri~uez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Nevertheless, Congress largely ignored testimony to
that effect at the hearings leading to Pub. L. No. 94-142. Blakely, supra note 5, at 615; see Com-
ment, A Legislative History, supra note 5, at 750; see also S. REP. No. 168, supra note 4, at 6,
reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1425, 1430; H.R. REP. No. 332, supra note 4, at
3-4.
For detailed consideration of the constitutional issues involved, see Blakely, supra note 5, at
606-13; Dimond, 7he Constitutional Right to Education: The Quiet Revolution, 24 HASTINGS L.J.
1087 (1973); Haggerty & Sacks, Education of the Handicapped- Towards a Defnition of an Appro-
priate Education, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 961, 961-984 (1977); Handel, The Role of the Advocate in Securing
the Handicapped Child's Right to an Effective Minimal Education, 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 349, 358-67
(1975); Herr, Retarded Children and the Law Enforcing the Constitutional Rights ofthe Mentally
Retarded, 23 SYRACUSE L. REV. 995 (1972); Krass, The Right to a Public Education for Handi-
capped Children: A Primerfor the New Advocate, 1976 U. ILL L.F. 1016, 1026-42; Weintraub &
Abeson, Appropriate Education for,411 Handicapped Childrer A Growing Issue, 23 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 1037 (1972); Yudof, Equal Opportunity and the Courts, 51 TEx. L. REv. 411 (1973); Com-
mentA Legislative History, supra note 5, at 746-50; Note, supra note 18, at 110-18, 129-35; see also
Note, Doning an "Appropriate Education" Under the Education for 411 Handicapped Children Act
of 1975, 34 ME. L. REv. 79, 82 n.27 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Deining].
20. 102 S. Ct. at 3044; Blakely, supra note 5, at 614.
21. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(5) (1976). Mills required that "each member of the plaintiff class is
to be provided with a publicly-supported educational program suitedto his needs," 348 F. Supp. at
19831
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ment22 and a provision safeguarding procedural due process during both the
evaluation and implementation stages.
23
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act24 was created to:
Assure that all handicapped children have available to them, within
the time periods specified [in the Act], a free appropriate pubic edu-
cation which emphasizes special education and related services
designed to meet their unique needs, to assure that the rights of
handicapped children and their parents or guardians are protected,
to assist States and localities to provide for the education of all hand-
icapped children, and to assess and assure the effectiveness of efforts
to educate handicapped children.
2 5
To accomplish this purpose the Act provided that beginning October 1, 1977
(fiscal year 1978), any state26 would be entitled to federal funds27 if it had in
effect a policy guaranteeing a free appropriate public education,28 and had set
forth a detailed plan for its implementation. 2 9 Handicapped children were
defined as "mentally retarded, hard of hearing, deaf, speech impaired, visually
handicapped, seriously emotionally disturbed, orthopedically impaired, or
other[s] . . . who by reason of [health or learning disabilities] require special
880 (emphasis added), and in PARC, the order mandated "education and training appropriate to
the child's capacity." 343 F. Supp. at 307 (emphasis added).
22. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (1976). The consent decree in PARC required that "among the
alternative programs... placement in a regular public school class is preferable to placement in a
special public school class and placement in a special public school class is preferable to place-
ment in any other type of program of education and training." 334 F. Supp. at 1260. Mills ex-
pressed a similar policy. 348 F. Supp. at 880.
23. PARC and Mills both provided for: (1) written notice of any proposed action concerning
a child's placement; (2) a right to an impartial hearing if there is an objection; (3) access to perti-
nent records; and (4) right to counsel, to examine witnesses, and to present evidence. 343 F. Supp,
at 303-05; 348 F. Supp. at 880-81;see Note, supra note 18, at 116-17. These and further safeguards
are codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1976), discussed infra at notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
24. For in depth treatment of the provisions and policies of the Act, see Blakely, supra note 5,
at 615-32; Haggerty & Sacks, supra note 19, at 984-94; Comment,, Legislative History supra note
5, at 724-41; Note, Enforcing the Right to an "4ppropriate"Education: The Educationfor A Hand-
icapped ChildrenAct of 1975, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1103 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, Enforcing];
Note, supra note 18, at 120-28.
25. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (Supp. V 1981).
26. Every state except New Mexico now receives money under the Act. 102 S. Ct. at 3039.
27. The amount of federal funds is calculated by multiplying the number of handicapped of
ages 3-18 (3-21 as of 1981) who were receiving special education in the state by a percentage of the
average cost per student throughout the country. The percentage was 5% in the 1978 fiscal year,
and increased yearly to a plateau of 40% in 1982. 20 U.S.C. § 1411(a)(i), (4) (1976). The Act
limits to 12% the number of children a state may count as "handicapped" in figuring funding
allotments. 20 U.S.C. § 141 l(a)(5)(A)(i) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The states are, however, required
to provide services for all handicapped, even if above the 12% ceiling.
The state education agency must distribute 75% of the funds directly to local education agen-
cies, and retains control over only the remaining 25%. 20 U.S.C. § 141 l(c)(1) (1976). See Colley,
The Education for ,411 Handicapped Children Act (EH,4): 4 Statutory & LegalAnalsis, 10 J. LAW
& EDUC. 137, 144-46 (1981).
28. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (1976). This is consistent with the Act's emphasis on local decision-
making, and is thought to encourage mainstreaming. See Large, supra note 5, at 242-43.
29. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2) (1976). The plan must include a timetable for accomplishing full
educational opportunity, a description of the facilities, personnel, and services required, and a
method to locate, identify, and evaluate handicapped children. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2), (3) (1976).




education and related services." 30
The term "free appropriate public education" (FAPE) means special edu-
cation and related services, provided at public expense and under public su-
pervision, which meet the standards of the state educational agency, include
an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the
state involved, and conform with the child's individualized education pro-
gram.3 1 To ensure a child's receipt of a FAPE designed to meet his specific
needs, the Act requires that local education agencies prepare for each handi-
capped child an Individualized Education Program (IEP).32 An IEP is a writ-
ten plan setting forth the child's present level of performance, a statement of
annual educational goals (including short-term objectives and the extent to
which the child can participate in regular programs), and a statement of spe-
cific services to be provided. It should also include a projected implementation
date and duration of the services, and appropriate objective criteria and proce-
dures for determining success in achieving objectives.
33
To implement and protect the right to a FAPE, the Act requires educa-
tional agencies seeking federal funds to identify, locate, and evaluate all hand-
icapped children in the jurisdiction,34 and imposes extensive procedural
guarantees. 35 The Act also requires state plans to "assure that, to the maxi-
30. Id § 1401(1).
31. Id § 1401(18); see infra text accompanying note 65.
32. Id § 1414(a)(5).
33. Id § 1401(19). The IEP is prepared at a meeting between a qualified representative of
the local education agency, parents or guardian, the child's teacher, and, if appropriate, the child.
Id The IEP has been described as a "process" as well as a document because it involves evalua-
tions and negotiations that help define the child's educational needs. Note, Education of Handi-
capped Children The IEP Process and the Searchfor an Appropriate Education, 56 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 81, 96-98 (1981).
Much has been written concerning the practical aspects of the IEP. It has been suggested that
the IEP process is too adversarial, with mediation offered as a possible solution. See Geiser, The
IEP Dilemma: Obstacles to Implementation, EXCEPTIONAL PARENT, Aug. 1979, at E14. But see
Shanker, Public Law 94-142: Prospects and Problems, EXCEPTIONAL PARENT, Aug. 1980, at 51, 55
(the teacher, like the school and the family, should have the right to counsel). It has also been
argued that the IEP is so time-consuming that teachers are left with insufficient time to teach. Id
at 52. See generally Excerpts from the Office ofSpecial Education's Policy Paper on the IEP, Ex-
CEPTIONAL PARENT, Aug. 1980, at 20.
With all its drawbacks, the IEP is generally viewed as an effective and essential tool for
parental influence of a child's education. Numerous "how to" materials are available to help the
parents prepare for the conference. See The IEP Conference, EXCEPTIONAL PARENT, Aug. 1980,
at 43; see also Geiser, supra, at E16. Cf. White, P.L 94-142's Touchiest Topics- Health Care,
Discipline, Summer School, AM. SCH. BD. J., Feb. 1981, at 19, 21 (coaching teachers on how to
handle appeals).
For the problems specific to formulation of a deaf child's IEP, see Johnson & Caccamise,
Rationale and Strategies for Planning Communication Individualized Education Programs (CIEP)
for Deaf Students, 126 AM. ANNALS OF THE DEAF 370 (1981); Large, supra note 5, at 255-63.
34. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(C) (1976). This was referred to by the Bureau of Education as
"Childfind." See Blakely, supra note 5, at 618.
35. These include: (I) an opportunity to present complaints concerning identification, evalua-
tion, or placement of the child, or the free appropriate public education of that child, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(b)(1)(E) (1976); (2) a requirement of notice to parents or guardians of a proposed change in
the child's placement, id § 1415(b)(1)(C); (3) the right to "an impartial due-process hearing," id
§ 1415(b)(2); and (4) the right to examine all relevant records, id § 1415(b)(1)(A).
At the due process hearing the parties have a right to counsel, to cross-examine witnesses and
compel their attendance, and to a written record of the hearing, including written findings of fact
1983]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW[
mum extent appropriate, handicapped children ... are educated with chil-
dren who are not handicapped. '36 This "mainstreaming" requirement,
probably the most controversial in the Act, was intended to encourage integra-
tion of the handicapped into society.
37
The Rowley case arose from a disagreement between the school system
and the deaf student's parents over what type of services best suited the child's
needs. Shortly after Amy Rowley was born, her parents, both deaf, began
training Amy in the use of Total Communication, which benefits38 people
with relatively good residual hearing39 and combines lipreading, manual com-
munication ("signing"), and the use of hearing aids. 40 When Amy's parents
enrolled her in public school, she was able to communicate and socialize better
than most deaf children, largely due to the efforts of her parents.41 The teach-
ers and administrators made great efforts to accomodate her by studying basic
sign language, installing a teletype machine in the office in order to communi-
cate with her parents at home, and providing Amy with an FM wireless hear-
ing aid.42 In February of her kindergarten year, a sign language interpreter
and decisions. Id § 1415(d). An initial decision made by a local education agency can be ap-
pealed to the state education agency, and then to either state or federal court. Id § 1415(e). A
reviewing court receives the record, but can hear additional evidence on request, and can grant
whatever relief it deems appropriate. Id 1415(e)(2).
The parents also have the right to an independent educational examination of the child. Id
§ 1415(b)(1)(A). See Geers, Moog & Calvert, The Independent Educational Evaluation, 82 VOLTA
Rav. 280 (1980) concerning the effectiveness of this provision for the deaf.
36. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (1976).
37. Although the Court in Rowley did not expressly deal with the issue ofmainstreaming, the
fact that Amy was in a mainstreamed school created the issue of what was an appropriate educa-
tion in sich an environment.
For discussions of the issues raised by mainstreaming, including the "dumping" of the handi-
capped, conflicts among educational policies, and fiscal concerns, see Blakely, supra note 5, at 629-
32; Miller & Miller, The Handicapped Child's Civil Right as it Relates to the 'east Restrictive
Environment" and Appropriate Mainstreaming, 54 IND. L.J. 1 (1978); Comment, A Legislative His.
tory, supra note 5, at 757-61, 769-79; Note, Enforcing, supra note 24, at 1118-24; Note, supra note
33, at 89-98. For case histories sympathetic to the concept of mainstreaming, see Blumberg, The
Casefor Integrated Schooling, EXCEFrIONAL PARENT, Aug. 1981, at 23; Lewis & FraserA voiding
Classroom Tokenism, EXCEPTIONAL PARENT, Aug. 1979, at E7.
The American Federation of Teachers supports mainstreaming on philosophical grounds, but
believes that such placements must be made cautiously and under proper conditions. Shanker,
supra note 33, at 52-53 enumerates suggested guidelines for effective placement. There are
problems with mainstreaming the deaf; some are unavoidable, and some are created by the Act.
Large, supra note 5, at 241-54.
38. The district court stated that deaf children raised in deaf households with Total Commu-
nication fare better academically and socially than other deaf children. Rowley v. Board of Educ.,
483 F. Supp. 528, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
39. Amy's residual hearing was best in the lower frequencies where vowel sounds, which are
difficult to lipread, are distinguished. Id at 529.
40. Large, supra note 5, at 235. Educators of the deaf are strongly divided about which type
of communication is best for deaf children. Proponents of oralism (lipreading) and auralism (am-
plification devices) feel that the combination allows the deaf to integrate more readily into society
and expand their employment opportunities. Manualists argue that it is unrealistic and often
detrimentally frustrating for deaf children to rely on verbal communication, Total Communica-
tion, while combining both schools, is critized by each. See id at 229-40.
41. 483 F. Supp. at 530. Even at the time of the litigation Amy's mother continued to spend
at least an hour daily working with her.
42. Id The aid allows teachers and classmates to speak into a transmitter when they read
aloud.
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was placed in Amy's classroom full-time for a two-week trial period. He re-
ported that Amy did not require his services and that she in fact ignored and
resisted his efforts.
43
In the preparation of Amy's IEP for the following year, the school sys-
tem's Committee on the Handicapped" recommended that Amy be provided
(1) the continued use of her FM wireless hearing aid; (2) one hour each day
with a tutor for the deaf; and (3) speech therapy for three one-hour sessions
per week.45 When the IEP was drafted to incorporate these guidelines, Amy's
parents objected, insisting that Amy be provided with an interpreter. The
Committee on the Handicapped reviewed the proposed IEP and rejected the
Rowleys' request.46 The Rowleys demanded and received a hearing before an
independent examiner, who agreed with the school system that an interpreter
was not necessary since "Amy was achieving educationally, academically and
socially" without one.47 This decision was appealed to the New York Com-
missioner of Education, who affirmed on the basis that the decision of the
examiner was supported by substantial evidence.
48
Amy's parents, pursuant to P.L. 94-142,49 brought suit in the Federal Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York.50 The court found that
Amy was "remarkably well adjusted," and that she interacted well with her
classmates and with her teachers, who were particularly sensitive and ac-
comodating to her needs.51 After considering the results of a number of
tests,52 the court determined that, although Amy was very bright and was pro-
gressing at slightly above the median in her class, she was only able to under-
stand fifty-nine percent of what was spoken in class. The court therefore
concluded that she was "not learning as much, or performing as well academi-
cally, as she would without her handicap."5 3 To determine what education
was appropriate, the court reasoned that Amy's performance should be com-
43. Rowley v. Board of Educ., 632 F.2d 945, 950 (2d Cir. 1980) (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
By affidavit, the interpreter testified that his recomendation referred to only the kindergarten class,
and was not intended to rule out similar assistance to Amy in subsequent grades. 483 F. Supp. at
530.
44. The Committee is comprised of a psychologist, educator, physician, and the parent of a
handicapped child. 34 C.F.R. § 300.532(e) (1981). The Committee heard expert evidence from
the Rowleys concerning the importance of sign language, and also testimony from school person-
nel familiar with Amy's case. 483 F. Supp. at 530-31. The New York procedures for IEP formu-
lation are controlled by article 89 of the New York Education Law. N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 4401-
4409 (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1982); see Note, supra note 33, at 98-106.
45. 483 F. Supp. at 531.
46. Id
47. 102 S. Ct. at 3040. The right to an independent evaluation is guaranteed by the Act. 20
U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(A) (1976); see Geers, Moog & Calvert, supra note 35 (concerning its
effectiveness).
48. 102 S. Ct. at 3040.
49. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (1976) provides for appeal to state or federal court. See supra note
35.
50. Rowley v. Board of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The district courts have
jurisdiction and can grant whatever relief they deem appropriate. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4) (1976).
51. 483 F. Supp. at 531.
52. The tests measured speech discrimination, academic achievement, and intelligence. The




pared to that of her nonihandicapped classmates of similar intellectual ability
and initiative.5 4 While all children have some "shortfall" between their poten-
tial and achievement, any additional shortfall on Amy's part would be "inher-
ent in her handicap and is precisely the kind of deficiency which the Act
addresses in requiring that every handicapped child be given an appropriate
education." 55 Therefore, the court reversed the findings of the Commissioner
and held that Amy had to be provided with an interpreter5 6 so that she would
have "an opportunity to achieve her full potential commensurate with the
opportunity provided other children. '57
Defendants Board of Education and New York Commissioner of Educa-
tion appealed the district court's decision to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit. The two-member majority affirmed the lower
court, agreeing with its conclusions of law and holding that its findings of fact
were not clearly erroneous.5 8 Because of the unique fact situation, the court
stated that its decision would have no precedential value.5 9 One judge dis-
sented, arguing that the district court had ignored the statutory definition of
free appropriate public education and had applied an erroneous and impracti-
cal standard.60
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and considered two issues:6 1 the
substantive standard of "appropriate" in the statutory directive, and the scope
of judicial review under the Act.62 The Court first applied itself to defining
"appropriate" and rejected the lower court's requirement that "states maxi-
mize the potential of handicapped children 'commensurate with the opportu-
nity provided other children.' "63 Stating that the language of the Act contains
no such requirement," the Court turned to the statutory definition of FAPE
for guidance:
The term 'free appropriate public education' means special education
54. Id at 534. The court rejected the school system's argument that Amy was receiving a
FAPE because she was performing above the average in her class and was advancing from grade
to grade.
55. Id at 535.
56. Id at 529.
57. Id at 534.
58. Rowley v. Board of Educ., 632 F.2d 945, 947 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
59. Id at 948 (following a special rule of the circuit, id at 948 n.7).
60. Id at 948 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). Judge Mansfield argued that the Act's legislative
history revealed an intent to promote the self-sufficiency of handicapped children, id at 952, and
contended that if a child's IEP enables her to become reasonably independent, productive, and
capable of achieving academically at a level roughly approximate to that of her peers, then the Act
has been complied with, id at 953. The judge felt that Amy's progress, as summarized above, was
clear evidence of such compliance. Id Judge Mansfield dissented on two additional points: (1)
"the court should first have given the state educational authority. . . the opportunity to apply the
proper standard and submit their [sic] determination before deciding the case;" and (2) the court
erred in considering certain affidavits not presented below. Id at 948.
61. 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982). Justice Rehnquist delivered the Court's opinion, with Justice
Blackmun filing a concurrence, while Justice White, with whom Justices Brennan and Marshall
joined, dissented.
62. Id at 3040.
63. Id at 3042 (quoting 483 F. Supp. at 534).
64. Id
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and related services which (A) have been provided at public expense,
under public supervision and direction, and without charge, (B) meet
the standards of the State educational agency, (C) include an appro-
priate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the
State involved, and (D) are provided in conformity with the individ-
ualized education program required in section 1414(a)(5) of this
title.
65
"Special education," the Court continued, means "specially designed instruc-
tion ... to meet the unique need of a handicapped child," and "related serv-
ices" are those "as may be required to assist a handicapped child to benefit
from special education."' 66 Stressing this requirement of benefit, the Court de-
termined that "if personalized instruction is being provided with sufficient
supportive services to permit the child to benefit from the instruction, and the
other items on the definitional checklist are satisfied, the child is receiving a
'free appropriate public education' as defined by the Act.
' 67
Because of the lack of precision in the statutory definition, the Court
turned to the legislative history of the Act to determine whether Congress had
intended any greater substantive requirements. 68 First, it looked at PA4/RC and
Mills, because they had served as impetus to-the Act,69 and read both as equal
protection cases requiring primarily that handicapped children have access to
an adequate publicly supported education, but with no particular requirement
as to the substance of that education.70 This reasoning followed logically, said
the Court, in light of statements made by legislators during the debates on the
Act that emphasized the numbers of handicapped children excluded from
public education,71 and was supported by remarks characterizing the "3.9 mil-
lion handicapped children who were 'served'" in 1975 as "receiving an appro-
priate education." 72 Thus, the Court determined, Congress equated FAPE
with access to public education plus receipt of some specialized services.
73
The Court also rejected respondents' argument that the intent of the Act was
to provide equal educational opportunity,74 stating instead that the goal was to
65. Id at 3041 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (18) (1976) (emphasis supplied by the Court).
66. Id (quoting 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(16)-(17) (1976)).
67. Id at 3042.
68. Id
69. Id at 3043. See supra text accompanying note 18.
70. Id at 3044. The Court stated that, similar to the Act, P4RC and Mills established proce-
dures for formulating the substantive standard, but did not require any such standard. But see
infra text accompanying notes 110-18.
71. The Court read these statements as showing that "the intent of the Act was more to open
the door of public education to handicapped children on appropriate terms than to guarantee any
particular level of education once inside." 102 S. Ct. at 3043; see id at 3043 n.13; S. REP. No. 168,
supra note 4, at 11, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1425, 1435; see also 121
CONG. REc. 19,486 (1975).
72. 102 S. Ct. at 3045-46 & nn.19-20. The remarks refer to statistics of the Bureau of Educa-
tion for the Handicapped-of eight million handicapped children, one million were entirely ex-
cluded and only 3.9 million were receiving special services. A chart in the Senate report indicated
that these 3.9 million children were "served." S. REP. No. 168, supra note 4, at 8, reprinted in 1975
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1425, 1432.
73. 102 S. Ct. at 3046.
74. The Court said that "'equal' educational opportunities would... present an entirely
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provide a "basic floor of opportunity consistent with equal protection."' Ts
Since equal protection required only equal access, a congressional provision
for specialized educational services for the handicapped could not be inter-
preted as imposing any substantive educational standard on the states. In-
stead, the Court determined that the intent of Congress was "primarily to
identify and evaluate handicapped children, and to provide them with access
to a free public education."
'76
Implicit in Congress' assurance of access to education, 77 and confirmed
by the Act's requirement of supportive services to assist a handicapped child in
benefiting from special education, 78 the Court found a mandate that "'the
basic floor of opportunity' provided by the Act consists of access to specialized
instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide ed-
ucational benefit to the handicapped child."' 79 The Court also cited statements
by legislators concerning the costs and benefits of educating the handicapped
so that "many would be able to become productive citizens contributing to
society instead of being forced to remain burdens. Others. . .would increase
their independence, thus reducing their dependence on society." 80 These
statements, the Court said, supported its definition of FAPE as an education
which "provide[s] some educational benefits to the handicapped child." 81
Because of the range of handicaps covered by the Act, the Court limited
its holding to mainstreamed children, such as Amy, rather than attempting to
formulate one test to judge the adequacy of "educational benefits."182 The
Court held that, since grading, yearly advancement, and graduation from the
public schools are society's yardsticks of educational benefit,83 the require-
ment of a FAPE is satisfied by:
providing personalized instruction with sufficient support services to
permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction. Such
instruction and services must be provided at public expense, must
unworkable standard requiring impossible measurements and comparisons." Id at 3047. This is
reminiscent of Judge Mansfield's dissent in the circuit court. 632 F.2d at 953 (Mansfield, J.,
dissenting).
75. 102 S. Ct. at 3047.
76. Id at 3048.
77. The Court said that receiving some benefit is implicit because it would do little good for
Congress to spend millions of dollars in providing mere access without some benefit. Id
78. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1976).
79. 102 S. Ct. at 3048.
80. Id at n.23 (quoting S. REP. No. 168, supra note 4, at 9, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 1425, 1433. In Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Pa. 1979), aldsub
non. Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 968 (1981), the
district court interpreted the Act as setting a substantive standard of maximizing self-sufficiency.
Id at 603-04. The Supreme Court in Rowley rejected this standard. 102 S. Ct. at 3048 n.23.
Battle is discussed in Stark, Tragic Choices in SpecialEducation: The Effect ofScarce Resources on
the Implementation of Pub. L No. 94-142, 14 CONN. L. REv. 477, 501-04 (1982); Note, supra note
19, at 92-101; Note, supra note 33, 
at 106-10.
81. 102 S. Ct. at 3048.
82. Id at 3049.
83. Id The Court said that progress from grade to grade is not conclusive proof that a child
has received FAPE. Amy's progress, however, taken in light of the services she received, was
dispositive of the issue. Id n.25.
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meet the State's educatonal standards, must approximate the grade
levels used in the State's regular education, and must comport with
the child's IEP. In addition, the IEP, and therefore the personalized
instruction, should be formulated in accordance with the require-
ments of the Act and, if the child is being educated in the regular
classrooms of the public education system, should be reasonably cal-
culated to enable the child to achieve passing marks and advance
from grade to grade.8
4
The Court next considered the issue of the scope ofjudicial review, which
the petitioner school system argued was limited to ensuring procedural com-
pliance,8 5 while respondents contended that the Act authorized de novo re-
view of all aspects of educational decisions.8 6 Because Congress had expressly
rejected language restricting review, 87 the Court refused to adopt the school's
position. Nevertheless, since Congress had established elaborate and specific
procedural safeguards, the Court also rejected de novo review. The Court
cited the Act's emphasis on procedures as support for its conclusion that "ade-
quate compliance with the procedures prescribed would in most cases assure
much if not all of what Congress wished in the way of substantive content in
an IEP."88 The Court then examined the provision that authorizes the review-
ing court "to grant 'such relief as the court determines is appropriate' [basing
its decision on the preponderance of the evidence]"8 9 in light of the require-
ment that the reviewing court "receive the records of the [state] administrative
proceedings." 90 The Court saw this as an implied requirement that the prior
proceedings receive due weight,9 1 and that judicial review be restricted.
Therefore, the Court held that a reviewing court's inquiry is twofold: (1)
whether the state complied with the procedures of the Act,92 and (2) whether
the IEP developed through those procedures is reasonably calculated to bene-
fit the handicapped child.
93
Applying these principles, the Court reversed the court of appeals, as
84. 102 S. Ct. at 3049.
85. Id at 3050.
86. Id at 3049.
87. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1976) provides that the reviewing court must receive the adminis-
trative record, hear additional evidence, and, based on a preponderance of the evidence, grant
such relief as it determines appropriate. This language was substituted at conference for language
which limited review to whether the states' decision was supported by substantial evidence. See S.
CONF. REP. No. 455, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 48-49, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1480, 1501-03; see also 632 F.2d 945, 948 n.5 (quoting H.R. 7217, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in
H.R. Rep. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1975)).
88. 102 S. Ct. at 3050.
89. Id at 3051 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1976)).
90. Id
91. Id
92. Id In a footnote, the Court indicated that part of this first inquiry is whether the state
has created an IEP in conformity with § 1401(19). Id at 3051 n.27. See supra text accompanying
note 33.
93. 102 S. Ct. at 3051. The Court warned against judges imposing their own view of educa-
tional policy, and noted that this case demonstrates the efficacy of the procedural trappings, espe-
cially the requirement of parental input, as parents will strongly advocate their child's position.
Id at 3051-52. But see infra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
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neither it nor the district court had found that the school system had failed to
comply with the procedures of the Act. Nor could the findings of either court
support a conclusion that Amy's educational program did not satisfy the sub-
stantive requirements of the Act.94 The dissenting Justices looked at the lan-
guage of the Act and its legislative history and argued in support of the lower
court's standard of "educational opportunity commensurate with that given
other children." 95 They also argued that there was no statutory or historical
support for the majority's limitations on judicial review.
96
In construing P.L. 94-142 in Rowley, the Supreme Court established rela-
tively conservative standards for a free appropriate public education, and also
for the scope ofjudicial review. While the Court was correct in stating that the
district court standard was not directly supported by the language of the Act,
97
and that the district court had mistakenly stated that the Act did not define
"appropriate,"98 it is clear that the statutory definition "tends toward the cryp-
tic." 99 For assistance the district court had looked to the regulations promul-
gated under section 504,100 which define "appropriate" as education "designed
to meet individual educational needs of handicapped persons as adequately as
the needs of non-handicapped persons are met." 01 The Solicitor General ar-
gued in his brief opposing the grant of certiorari that this reliance on the sec-
tion 504 regulations was proper.102 Although the language of the regulations
in effect under the Act at the time of the district court's decision supports this
view, 10 3 the Court ignored the argument.
94. 102 S. Ct. at 3052-53. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings
consistent with the opinion because the lower court had previously failed to reach the issue of
procedural compliance.
Justice Blackmun concurred in the result, but would have applied a standard of "whether
Amy's program, viewed as a whole, offered an opportunity to understand and participate in the
classroom that was substantially equal to that given her nonhandicapped classmates." Id at 3053
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). He felt that the emphasis should be on equality
of access and opportunity, rather than the propriety of a particular educational outcome. Justice
Blackmun felt that the school system had satisfied this standard.
95. Id at 3055 (White, J., dissenting). Contending that the majority's restrictive standard of
services, which mandates merely some educational benefit, would be satisfied by providing a deaf
child with a loud-voiced teacher, the dissent asserted that the Act requires more: "The basic floor
of opportunity is. . .intended to eliminate the effects of the handicap, at least to the extent that
the child will e given an equal opportunity to learn if that is reasonably possible." Id
96. d f 3056-57. The dissent would allow a "full and searching inquiry" into any aspect of
a handicapped child's education. Id at 3057.
97. Id at 3042. The district court standard that the Court criticized was "that States maxi-
mize the potential of handicapped children 'commensurate with the opportunity provided to other
children. " Id (quoting 483 F. Supp. at 534).
98. Id at 3041; see 483 F. Supp. at 533. The court of appeals agreed with the lower court's
standard. 632 F.2d at 947. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1976); supra text accompanying note 65.
99. 102 S. Ct. at 3041. Commentators have struggled with the meaning of FAPE and the
intent of Congress in passing the Act. See generally Colley, supra note 27, at 137; Haggerty &
Sacks, supra note 19; Stark, supra note 80; Note, Enforcing, supra note 24; Note, Defning, supra
note 19.
100. See supra note 5.
101. 483 F. Supp. at 533 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 84.33(b) (1979)).
102. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 7-13.
103. The regulations in effect under the Act at the time of the district court's decision required
that state plans submitted under 20 U.S.C. § 1413 assure compliance with § 504 regulations. 45
C.F.R. § 121a.150 (1979) (replaced by 45 C.F.R. §§ 100b.201, .500 (1980); recodified at 34 C.F.R.
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To determine its own standard, the Court looked at the definition of
FAPE in the Act,' ° 4 but then focused on language defining "related services"
as those which "may be required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from
special education."'10 5 The Court ignored the statutory definition of. IEP, to
which related services are required to conformI ° 6 and which demands "spe-
cially designed instruction to meet the unique needs of handicapped chil-
dren."10 7 Similarly, the Court overlooked the definition of Special Education,
which requires that "unique needs" be met.'0 8 These provisions support the
dissent's argument that the majority's standard of receiving some "educational
benefit" falls short of congressional intent in passing P.L. 94-142. It seems
clear that meeting "unique needs" requires more than merely providing "edu-
cational benefit."' 0 9
Just as the Court construed the language of the Act to set a less rigorous
standard of "appropriate," in interpreting PARC and Mills as mere access
cases, 110 it sidestepped language in each case requiring more. PARC required
"access to a free public program of education and training appropriate to...
learning capacities."' IIMills speaks of "publicly-supported education consis-
tent with . . . needs and ability to benefit therefrom." 1 2 Nonetheless, the
Court said that neither case required any substantive level of education. 113 It
is also clear from the legislative history that the Act "incorporated the major
principles of the right to education cases." 114 When Congress brought all
handicapped children within the scope of the Act," 15 promising to "meet their
unique needs"' 1 6 and setting "a goal of providing full educational opportunity
to all handicapped children," 117 Congress seems to have intended to offer a
§§ 76.201, .500 (1981)); see 45 Fed. Reg. 77,368 (1980); see also Haggerty & Sacks, supra note 19,
at 984-87.
In fact, one writer has suggested that Rowley could have been decided under § 504. See
Note, Defining, supra note 19, at 104 (published prior to the Supreme Court decision).
104. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1976); see supra text accompanying note 65.
105. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1976); see supra text accompanying note 66.
106. 20 U.S'C. § 1401(18) (1976); see supra text accompanying note 65.
107. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19) (1976).
108. Id § 1401(16) (quoted in 102 S. Ct. at 3055 (White, J., dissenting)).
109. In fact, the dissenters' argument that a teacher with a loud voice would satisfy the major-
ity's standard seems to be valid. See supra note 95.
110. 102 S. Ct. at 3044; see supra text accompanying note 70.
111. 334 F. Supp. at 1258.
112. 348 F. Supp. at 876.
113. 102 S. Ct. at 3044.
114. S. REP. No. 168, supra note 4, at 8, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1425, 1432. PARC and Mills are dicussed throughout the congressional reports. See e.g., H.R.
REP. No. 332, mora note 4, at 3-5.
115. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(1) (1976).
116. Id § 1400(c) (Supp. V 1981) (Congressional Declaration of Purpose).
117. Id § 1412(2)(A)(i) (1976). The dissent referred to this language, 102 S. Ct. at 3054
(White, J., dissenting), as did the concurrence, 102 S. Ct. at 3053 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See
Stark, supra note 80, at 499 n.103; see also S. REP. No. 168, supra note 4, at 9, reprinted in 1975
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1425, 1433; see also 102 S. Ct. at 3054 (White, J., dissenting)
(citing remarks from the CONGRESSIONAL REcoRD).
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higher standard of educational benefit than the Court allowed."18
In its search for the congressional intent in passing P.L. 94-142, the Court
also ignored a major indication of that intent-the Congressional Findings-
which speaks of "full equality of opportunity."' 19 Instead, the Court looked at
the legislative history and stressed references to exclusion from education as
evidence that mere access was the legislative goal. 120 The dissent, however,
pointed to numerous references espousing a goal of "equal opportunity,"
which the majority ignored.' 21 The dissent also cited statements emphasizing
"maximum potential"'122 and "education . . . equivalent, at least, to the one
those children who were not handicapped receive." 123 This is not to say that
one or the other standard is necessarily definitive, but rather that the Courtmisrepresented the congressional attitude in order to support its standard of
"access with some educational benefit."' 124
Similarly, by stressing the language of long-run cost benefits and self-
sufficiency, 125 the majority lost sight of the fact that although self-sufficiency is
a valid goal for many severely handicapped children, many of the handi-
capped, particularly the sensory deprived, are largely self-sufficient before at-
tending school. 126 The Court could easily have read the language "many
would. . . become productive citizens, contributing to society"' 127 as evincing
a broader legislative goal of realizing the potential of the handicapped not
only in terms of relieving society from the the burdens of their dependence, or
a simple cost/benefit analysis of their education, but in terms of every aspect
118. Query whether, if mere access were intended, there is any need for the Act. The right to
access had already been established judicially in .PARC and Mills.
119. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(3) (Supp. V 1981). The congressional findings also asserted a na-
tional interest in assuring to all handicapped children "equal protection of the law." Id
§ 1400(b)(9). The Court in Rowley, however, restrictively defined equal protection by a narrow
reading of P.ARC and Mills, see supra note 70 and accompanying text.
120. 102 S. Ct. 3043-46; see also supra text accompanying notes 70-73.
121. 102 S. Ct. at 3054 (White, J., dissenting). The majority called these "passing references"
and said that they were "too thin a reed on which to base an interpretation of the Act." Id at 3049
n.26. The dissent refuted this, saying that the statements were too frequent to be "passing refer-
ences." Id at 3054 (White, J., dissenting). See id n.l, in which Justice White argued that state-
ments cited by the majority emphasizing exclusion were often linked to statements urging equality
of opportunity.
122. 102 S. Ct. at 3054 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 332, supra note 4, at 19);
see 121 CONG. REc. 23,709 (1975).
123. 102 S. Ct. at 3055 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting 121 CONG. Rac. 19,483 (1975) (state-
ment of Sen. Stafford)).
124. Id at 3048-49.
125. Id at 3048 n.23; see supra note 80 and accompanying text.
126. See Brief for the National Ass'n of the Deaf as Amicus Curiae, at 19-20. The Court
recognized that because some handicapped children enter school self-sufficient, and because
others will never be able to achieve self-sufficiency, self-sufficency "as a substantive standard is at
once an inadequate protection and an overly demanding requirement." 102 S. Ct. at 3048 n.23.
The Court, however, used the legislative history to support its standard of "access to specialized
instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit."
This relatively conservative standard fails to recognize that just as many handicapped children
require little or nothing from schools in order to achieve sef-sufficency, many others require little
in order to "benefit," but will still be left far short of their potential. Id at 3048.
127. 102 S. Ct. at 3048 n.23 (quoting S. REP. No. 168, supra note 4, at 9, reprintedin 1975 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1425, 1433).
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by which a person is able to develop and contribute to society. This reading
seems to harmonize more with the overall tenor of the Act, and is consistent
with the proposition that if Congress had intended self-sufficiency, or mere
access, to be the determinative criterion in construing the legislation, it would
have been relatively simple to use such language in the text of the Act.
128
In applying its conclusion (that the Act guarantees the child some "educa-
tional benefit") to the facts of Rowley, the Court relied heavily on Amy's
grades and progress through the school system to determine whether the stan-
dard had been satisfied.' 29 The Court pointed out that although such progress
was dispositive in Rowley, it would not always be so; nevertheless, little gui-
dance was offered to assist courts in determining when performance is not
dispositive or what other factors are to be considered, and with what relative
weight.' 30 In addition, while it is certainly proper that grades and advance-
ment be considered in assessing a child's achievement, the Court made them
the determinative test for the propriety of a mainstreamed child's IEP.' 3 1 This
emphasis conflicts with the nature of the IEP process, which calls for individu-
alized annual evaluation and goals.' 32 While in certain instances passing
marks may be a legitimate goal, Congress eschewed such a general standard,
preferring individual assessment. It appears that the Court's broad approach
contradicts this preference and undermines the IEP itself.
Much as the Court used Rowley as a vehicle to establish a conservative
definition of FAPE, so too did it limit the scope of judicial review under the
Act. Although it expressly rejected petitioner's argument that review should
be limited to ensuring state compliance with procedures, the Court's emphasis
on the number and detail of the procedural protections 33 makes its final two-
part inquiry134 more nearly aligned with petitioners' contention than with re-
spondents' assertion that the Act called for de novo review of all aspects of the
standard. Certainly the procedural safeguards articulated by the Act are elab-
orate, in part resulting from their being drafted to counter overt discrimination
against the handicapped.' 35 It is not clear, however, that they were also in-
128. In its efforts to minimize congressional concern with the substantive meaning of FAPE,
the Court went so far as to construe "appropriate" as intended "as much to describe the settings in
which handicapped children should be educated as to prescribe the substantive content or sup-
portive services of their education." Id at 3046 n.21.
This confusion of the statutory preference for mainstreaming "to the maximum extent appro-
priate," 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (1976), with the mandate of FAPE in § 1401(18), was pointed out by
the dissent. 102 S. Ct. at 3055-56 (White, J., dissenting). The use of the term "appropriate" in
many sections of the Act accords with congressional concern for discretion and flexibility in the
Act's operation, rather than for hard and fast rules that are inapplicable to education. In the
context of the opinion, this stretching for support makes the reader suspect the majority's belief in
the soundness of its own rhetoric.
129. 102 S. Ct. at 3049.
130. The Court merely noted that "if the child is being educated in the regular classrooms...
[the IEP] should be reasonably calculated to enable the child to achieve passing marks and ad-
vance from grade to grade." Id at 3049.
131. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19) (1976) (defining IEP).
132. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 85-9 1.
134. See supra text accompanying note 93.
135. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (Supp. V 1981). The congressional findings note the number of
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tended to be the ultimate test of whether FAPE has been provided. Although
courts generally avoid decisions involving purely educational policy, the fail-
ure of the Act to limit review and its express direction that courts grant "such
relief as the court determines is appropriate,"1 3 6 as the dissent pointed out,
seem to indicate a congressional intent that the scope of judicial review be
somewhat broader than the majority would allow. 137 The majority also ig-
nored a Conference Committee report directing courts to make an "independ-
ent decision." The dissent called attention to the report, 138 as well as to
similar statements made by Senator Williams, the Act's chief sponsor, empha-
sizing review of any matter relating to FAPE1
39 or the original complaint.140
In an effort to bolster its argument that the procedures are sufficient to protect
a child's right to FAPE, the majority emphasized procedures guaranteeing pa-
rental input and stated that "[a]s this very case demonstrates, parents and
guardians will not lack ardor in seeking to ensure that handicapped children
receive all of the benefits to which they are entitled by the Act."'141 This con-
tention, however, is somewhat specious, for not all parents have the time, so-
phistication, and purse to effectively confront local and state agencies.'
4 2
In addition, even though educational policy has traditionally been left to
the states, 143 under the Act Congress expressed an interest in ensuring that
federal funds are properly spent. This interest is particularly strong since there
is a financial incentive for schools to label children "handicapped,"' 144 but
then to place them in a relatively inexpensive program.1 45 Understanding this
tension, it is more likely that Congress granted the courts authority to scruti-
nize educational decisions, rather than merely to determine whether proce-
dures were followed and whether the IEP was reasonably calculated to
produce an educational benefit. Although it is important, as the majority
warns, that courts "avoid imposing their view of preferable educational meth-
ods upon the States"'146 and give "due weight" to the administrative proceed-
handicapped children who are excluded from education, and those who are not completely ex-
cluded but whose needs nevertheless are not met. See also supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
136. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1976).
137. See supra note 87.
138. 102 S. Ct. at 3056 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting S. CONF. REP. No. 455, supra note 87,
at 50, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1480, 1503).
139. 102 S. Ct. at 3056 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting 121 CoNG. REc. 37,415 (1975)).
140. Id (quoting 121 CONG. REc. 37,416 (1975)).
141. Id at 3052.
142. See Large, supra note 5, at 255-63; Note, Enforcing, supra note 24, at 1110-13. Parents
often feel railroaded into their child's IEP. See, e.g., M.J.S., Parents andthe EP., EXCEPTIONAL
PARENT, Aug. 1979, at E10.
143. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); see also San Antonio Indep. School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1973).
144. States receive funds for each child so labeled. 20 U.S.C. § 141 l(a)(1) (1976).
145. Note, Enforcing, supra note 24, at 1110 n.43. See Haggerty & Sacks, supra note 19, at
991; Hartman, Policy Effects of Special Education Funding Formulas, 6 J. EDUC. FIN. 135, 156-57
(1980); Shanker, supra note 33, at 54.
146. 102 S. Ct. at 3051. The Court also warned that "once a court determines the require-
ments of the Act have been met, questions of methodology are for resolution by the States." Id at
3052.
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ings, 147 it is possible that these goals could have been satisfied without
restricting judicial review more narrowly than the Act, its policies, and its his-
tory indicate was intended by the legislature.
It is somewhat superficial, however, to criticize the Court's conservative
interpretation of the Act without recognizing certain considerations, outside
the facts of the Rowley case, that may have influenced the decision. One is the
long-standing philosophy that education should be left to state control, within
constitutional limitations,' 48 which conforms with the current trend of mini-
mizing federal involvement in affairs of a local nature.' 49 This concern was
manifested by limiting review of state and local educational decisions, and is
evidenced by the Court's reference to San Antonio School District v.
Rodriguez.1
50
Money may have been the Court's major concern.' 5 ' The cost of special
education is rising at a rate greater than twice that of regular education.
152
Congress has not allocated enough money to pay for special programs re-
quired by the Act,153 and yearly appropriations are less than the cost of autho-
rizations. 154 The financial concerns of the Court are best illustrated by its
reference to the limit of Congress' use of its spending power to obligate state
compliance with federal conditions.155 Because of conflicts between educa-
147. Id at 3051.
148. See supra note 143.
149. See Stark, supra note 80, at 528-29 (discussing the attempts to conform the Act to the
"New Federalism").
150. See 102 S. Ct. at 3052 (citations omitted) (quoting San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodgriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42 (1973)):
We previously have cautioned that courts lack the "specialized knowledge and experi-
ence" necessary to resolve "persistent and difficult questions of educational policy." We
think that Congress shared that view when it passed the Act. As already demonstrated,
Congress' intention was not that the Act displace the primacy of States in the field of
education, but that States receive funds to assist them in extending their educational
systems to the handicapped. Therefore, once a court determines that the requirements of
the Act have been met, questions of methodology are for resolution by the States.
Cf. Plyer v. Doe, 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982) (Texas statute depriving illegal alien children of access to
education violates the equal protection clause), which indicates that the federal government will
not defer to state education policies that violate a constitutional provision.
151. It has been estimated that the cost of Pub. L. No. 94-142 to New York City could reach
$50 million. Shanker, supra note 33, at 56. To provide interpreters for the deaf in New York State
could cost an estimated $100 million. McCarthy, Education for the Handicapped- Lawyers and
Judges Will Decide "at Your Schools Can and Can't Do for Students, AM. ScH. BD. J., July 1981,
at 24, 24-25 (1981).
152. 121 CONG. REc. 23,705 (July 21, 1975). See generally Stark, supra note 80. A single sign
language interpretter costs between $10,000 and $20,000 per year. Flygare, Recent Court Decisions
Could Greatly Increase Cost of Special Education Programs, 62 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 210, 210
(1980).
153. See Colley, supra note 27, at 145; Shanker, supra note 33, at 55; Stark, supra note 80, at
484-87.
154. Vernon, Education's "Three Mile Island'" PL 94-142, PEABODY J. EDUC., Oct. 1981, at
24, 26 (1981); see Shanker, supra note 33, at 55. See generally McCarthy, Handicapped Children:
Legal Mandates and Fiscal Implications 5 J. EDUC. FIN. 334 (1980) (arguing to limit services);
Weiker, The Needfor a Strong EducationforAll Handicapped Children Act, 14 CONN. L. REV. 471
(1982) (arguing for increased appropriations).
155. "The legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate under the spending power thus rests on
whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the contract. 102 S. Ct. at
3049 n.26 (quoting Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
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tional and financial priorities, some commentators have predicted a "back-
lash" against special education.156 As a result, the Reagan administration
proposed regulations purporting to offer some relief,157 but because of adverse
public reaction, many of the proposals have since been withdrawn.' 58
These problems are exacerbated by tensions within the Act itself. For
example, the mainstreaming requirement, 159 which is supposed to aid handi-
capped and nonhandicapped children to integrate socially, often results in a
lower standard of academic excellence. 160 Not only is mainstreaming contro-
versial as an educational policy, but it also requires extra staff with special
training and reduced class sizes, thereby increasing demands on local school
budgets. 16 1 Another tension is the "related services" provision, which requires
medical services for diagnostic and evaluative purposes,162 but does not distin-
guish educational from noneducational services. As a result, many costly
156. The financial crisis created by the Act is discussed in McCarthy, supra note 151, at 25;
Stark, supra note 80, at 524 & n.201; Vernon, supra note 154, at 27. The strains of the IEP process
are equally strong. See Blakely, supra note 5, at 627-29; Shanker, supra note 33, at 51-52; Stark,
supra note 80, at 483 n.20.
157. U.S. Department of Education Proposed Changes to P.L. 94-142 Regulations, 47 Fed.
Reg. 33,836 (Aug. 4, 1982); see Stark, supra note 80, at 524-29.
One proposal, which is opposed by some critics who claim it contradicts the basic nature of
mainstreaming, would eliminate § 121a.552(a)(3) of the regulations, which requires placement as
near as possible to the child's home. See DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, COUN-
CIL FOR EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN, AN ANALYSIS OF U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION PRO-
POSED CHANGES to P.L. 94-142 Regulations 14 (Aug. 4, 1982). While open to abuse, the proposal
could prevent some duplication of services by allowing more flexibility in placement.
158. The general reaction was that the proposed changes would emasculate the Act. See Asso-
ciation for Retarded Citizens/N.C., "The Consumer" Info-gram (Sept. 3, 1982); DEPARTMENT OF
GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 157; see also Stark, supra note 80, at 524-29 (concerning
the proposed new regulations); Weicker, supra note 154 (criticizing block grant proposals). But
see Tufts, The Washington Climate and Handicapped Persons.- A Report from Jean Tufts, EXCEP-
TIONAL PARENT, Apr. 1982, at 13. Mrs. Tufts, Assistant Secretary, Special Education and Reha-
bilitative Services, U.S. Department of Education, presented the administration's viewpoint on the
proposed regulations.
159. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
160. Large, supra note 5, at 241-54, discusses the counterbalancing considerations and con-
cludes that, particularly with the deaf, the regular schools simply do not have the sophistication to
provide the academic opportunities offered at specialized placements. See also Note, Enforcing,
supra note 24, at 1121-24. But see Blakely, supra note 5, at 621, who suggests that mainstreaming
not only facilitates integration of the handicapped, but improves self-esteem, which will have the
effect of improving academic performance. Cf. Hanley, Adrtl in the Mainstream?, EXCEPTIONAL
PARENT, Aug. 1979, at E3 (putting a child into a mainstreamed environment has the effect of
damaging self-image because the child cannot fully compete with his "normal" peers, and his
disabilities seem more apparent than in private placement). Compare Harris, Hearing Impaired
Childrern What Environment is Least RestrictiveZ EDUC. UNLIMITED, Nov.-Dec. 1980, at 14, 15
(postulating that residential placement is frequently less restrictive than the regular classroom;
also suggesting that the availablility of specialized services is far greater at residential placements,
particularly at those for the deaf). See also Freeman, Gavron & Williams, Public Law 94-142.,
Promises to Keep, EDUC. HomizoNs, Spring 1981, at 107, 109, which asks how mainstreaming can
eliminate the stigma of being labeled handicapped, if to be "mainstreamed," the child must first
be labeled handicapped.
161. Blakely, supra note 5, at 627-33; see Shanker, supra note 33, at 54. Cf. Stark, supra note
80, at 493-94 (arguing that mainstreaming has had the ironic effect of reducing costs because it is
cheaper than residential placement). In suits pertaining to this element of the Act, nearly seven
times as many parents seek residential placement as mainstreaming. Id at 494; see, e.g., Davis,
Mainstreaming Versus an Appropriate Education, 6 Y.B. SPECIAL EDUC. 29 (1981).
162. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1976).
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medical expenses have been introduced into school budgets. 163
In addition, the Court may have been influenced by the amount of time
and money spent by schools litigating claims under the Act.164 While any
definitive standard would have reduced the litigation, by setting a conservative
standard and particularly by limiting judicial review, Rowley could greatly
reduce these costs.
Whatever factors may have affected the outcome of the case, as the first
judicial interpretation of P.L. 94-142, Rowley will profoundly influence handi-
capped education. Although the Court expressly limited its holding to main-
streamed children who are receiving special instruction and services and are
performing above the class average, 165 the groundwork for that holding estab-
lished certain inescapable parameters for defining FAPE. By expressly re-
jecting an interpretation that the Act was intended to "maximize potential"'
16 6
and substituting a standard that the handicapped child need only receive "ed-
ucational benefit,"' 167 the Court has authorized for all handicapped children a
standard that should be met with relative ease by school systems. The stan-
dard offers the potential for abuse by an unscrupulous school administration,
which could conceivably cut services to provide a handicapped child with only
a minimal benefit, yet still fulfill the Act's requirements. In fact, although hy-
perbolic, the dissent's contention that a deaf child would "benefit" from a
teacher with a loud voice seems valid. 168 Clearly, in order to protect the rights
of handicapped children, "benefit" must not be read apart from the require-
ments of specialized instruction and related services individually designed to
confer the benefit.
169
The Court's emphasis on progress from grade to grade 170 as satisfying the
"benefit" test for mainstreamed children may also favor certain children while
penalizing others. Children with physical handicaps will be affected very little
by the Court's approach, because once physical access and mobility are pro-
vided, the ability to learn is usually not affected. 17 ' Children with sensory
handicaps, however, such as Amy, may tend to aggregate near the class me-
163. See Stark, supra note 80, at 495-97; see also White, supra note 33, at 20. Consider Tatro
v. Texas, 625 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1980), in which a school was forced to catheterize a child. Tatro is
discussed in Note,.A Confusion of Rights and Remedies, 14 CONN. L. REv. 585 (1982).
164. It has been suggested that the entire IEP process is too adversarial. See Geiser, Commen-
tary, EXCEPTIONAL PARENT, Aug. 1979, at E2; White, supra note 33, at 20. Mediation has been
suggested as a means both to protect the rights of handicapped children and to save expense.
Geiser, supra note 33, at E14. The use of trained advocates has also been suggested. CommentA
Legislative History, supra note 5, at 326; see Note, Enforcing, supra note 24, at 1112.
165. 102 S. Ct. at 3049.
166. Id at 3042.
167. Id; see supra text accompanying note 67.
168. 102 S. Ct. at 3055 (White, J., dissenting); see supra note 95.
169. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. In Rowley, it was clear that Amy was receiving
individually designed services and that they conferred educational benefit. It is likely that a
"teacher with a loud voice" would confer benefit as well, but would not satisfy the test of "special-
ized instruction and related services which are individually designed."
170. 102 S. Ct. at 3049.
171. These children, however, do require that other courses, physical education being the most
obvious example, be especially tailored to their needs.
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dian, rather than being spread over the normal curve reflecting their abilities.
This would result from the likelihood that greater effort and resources will be
expended to bring children with greater learning difficulties up to passing stan-
dard, while diminished services may be provided to the more capable or gifted
handicapped children, who could continue to progress, but now may never be
able to excel. 172 If this shifting of services does occur, it will be attributable
solely to the influence of the child's handicap, even though it is arguable that
the influence of a child's handicap on his education was the very thing the Act
was intended to prevent.1 73 Thus, the most capable handicapped children
may bear the burden of Rowley, and their parents may be faced with a hard
choice between the socialization benefits of the mainstreamed environment or
the educational advantages of the private institution.1 74 Many families cannot
afford to choose between these options.
75
Another problem with the Court's emphasis on academic performance is
that grades could be easily manipulated at a local level to give the appearance
of progress.' 76 Moreover, passing grades and progress through school do not
necessarily represent acceptable standards of learning. 177 Congress called for
setting yearly goals in the IEP, 178 recognizing that progress of the handi-
172. Amy Rowley has an I.Q. of 122, which is at the 92nd percentile in intelligence. J. SATr-
LER, ASSESSMENT OF CHILDREN'S INTELLIGENCE 458 table C-299 (1974). Yet she performs at
slightly above the median in her class. Rowley, 483 F. Supp. 528, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). She could
excel, yet, because she receives some benefits from the services provided, she is said to be receiving
FAPE, and is effectively trapped near the median.
There is a certain irony in the Court's conclusions, for Amy's parents are largely responsible
for her progress. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. If, in an effort to compensate for the
low standard established in Rowley, Amy's parents put more effort into working with Amy, the
school could arguably cut back services so long as she still received some benefit. Conversely, by
cutting back on time spent, her parents could perhaps force the school to do more. This is an
absurd situation, admittedly hyperbolic, but frighteningly rational within the context of Rowley.
173. Of course, this was simply the view of the district court, which, in light of the decision of
the Supreme Court, has lost its argumentative value. 483 F. Supp. at 535. But considering the
scope of the Act and its history, it seems that the intention of the Act was to remove or reduce as
much as possible the effects of handicaps as barriers to receiving education. While the district
court focused on comparing the educational shortfall of the handicapped to their nonhandicapped
peers, this was merely the means by which it attempted to quantify the effect of the handicap. The
thrust of the opinion was that once the effect was measured, steps could be taken to eliminate it, so
that the child could receive an educational "opportunity commensurate with. . . [that] provided
to other children." Id at 534. Perhaps if the district court had phrased its standard in terms of
eliminating as much of the adverse educational effects on the handicapped as is reasonably possi-
ble, its conclusion might have been less objectionable to the Court. See also 102 S. Ct. at 3055
(White, J., dissenting).
For an influential source in the district court's formulation, see Note, Enforcing, supra note
24, at 1125-27.
174. See supra note 160.
175. Large, supra note 5, at 260. It is conceivable that this problem could be compounded by
Rowley, for if the language emphasizing self-sufficiency is grasped as a goal for the more severely
handicapped, it may have the effect of channeling more dollars into educating the severely handi-
capped to self-sufficiency, and fewer to those who need only to "benefit." See supra notes 126-27
and accompanying text.
176. But see Geiser, supra note 33, at E16 (suggesting that in the case of handicapped children,
it is often necessary to modify the grading system in order to accurately reflect achievement).
177. See Donahue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 64 A.D.2d 29 (1978), afJ'd, 47 N.Y.2d
440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979), in which a student graduated from high school,
but could not read or write well enough to fill out job applications.
178. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19)(B) (1976).
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capped is not always measured as accurately by grades179 as it is by specific
individualized goals.' 80 By stressing grades, the Court has distorted the IEP
provision and weakened the ability of parents to monitor effectively their
child's progress through the attainment of particular goals. As a consequence,
parents will have to be more careful about requiring specificity in the IEP and
ensuring that the goals are met independently of grades. There will also be a
need for scrutiny of grading procedures, perhaps even at the judicial level.
The Court's heavy emphasis on the procedural safeguards in the Act
should force school systems and state educational agencies to adhere strictly to
those procedures. Once the procedures are followed, Rowley effectively ren-
ders the decisions made thereunder impervious to attack because there is no
room in the language of the decision for judges to review an IEP beyond
whether it is "reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational
benefits."' 81 By limiting the scope of judicial review, the court has strength-
ened the position of state and local education agencies. Parents, who started
out in a weak bargaining position,'8 2 have now lost the threat of suit as an
effective negotiating weapon during the IEP process.' 8 3 This shift in strength
will place a greater burden on the integrity of educators to make decisions that
are sound educationally rather than merely fiscally.' 8 4 Another effect of the
child's weakened position may be a push for better representation of the child
during the critical initial administrative stages. Commentators have suggested
protecting the child through the use of trained advocates, 8 5 or mediation,
which would have the additional advantage of eliminating administrative ex-
penses.' 86 After Rowley, such a change may become necessary.
One additional consequence of Rowley may be that the states will follow
the federal lead in construing the standards of FAPE under their individual
state statutes. While many state statutes are drafted in conformity with the
federal model, many others have explicit standards set out in the statute.' 8 7 At
179. See Geiser, supra note 33, at E16.
180. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19)(B) (1976) requires that the IEP set forth "a statement of annual
goals, including short-term instructional objectives." Section 1401(19)(E) (1976) calls for "appro-
priate objective criteria and evaluation procedures and schedules for determining, on at least an
annual basis, whether instructional objectives are being achieved."
181. 102 S. Ct. at 3051; see supra text accompanying note 93.
182. See Large, supra note 5, at 257-63; Silverberg, Due Process Hearings: Schools Have Home
Court Advantage, 4 AMICUS 89, 89-90 (1979).
183. But see Vernon, supra note 154, at 28 (urging that a minority of assertive parents abuse
the process at the cost of the remaining students). Some parents use the process as a release for
their own frustrations. Jacob, .4 SchoolAdministrator's View: Hidden Dangers, Hidden Costs, 4
AMicus 86 (1979).
184. Vernon,supra note 154, at 164; see Shanker, supra note 33, at 54. See generalo Hartman,
supra note 145.
185. Comment,4A Legislative History, supra note 5, at 326; see Note, Enforcing, supra note 24
at 1112.
186. See Geiser, supra note 33, at E14.
187. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 281.2 (West Supp. 1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 162.670
(Vernon Supp. 1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-7-401(1) (1981) (requiring services designed to
"meet the individual educational needs of handicapped persons as adequately as the needs of
nonhandicapped are met"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-2912 (Supp. 1982) (requiring services "suffi-
cient to meet the needs and maximize the capabilities of handicapped children").
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least one state court has held that its statute requires more than Rowley. 88 It
is certain that, at a minimum, the states must abide by the federal
requirements.
By focusing on the "benefit" language in the definition of related serv-
ices, 189 and by reading narrowly the germinal pre-Act cases' 90 and pursuant
legislative history, 19 1 the Supreme Court in Rowley established a relatively
conservative standard for FAPE.19 2 While the standard of receiving some ed-
ucational benefit is higher than the self-sufficiency standard argued by
some, 193 it is well below that espoused by the district court, upheld by the
circuit court, and defended by the dissent, of "maximizing potential commen-
surate with the opportunity offered other children."'194 Because the Court lim-
ited its holding to the precise facts before it, the effect on nonmainstreamed
students is an open question, although it appears certain that the standard of
receiving some benefit applies to all handicapped children.' 9 5
Particularly in light of the Court's emphasis on passing grades as satisfy-
ing educational benefit, Rowley could have the effect of allowing schools to cut
back on services, particularly those offered to the more gifted handicapped
children.196 Additionally, by stressing grades as a test for appropriate educa-
tion, the Court has potentially weakened the effectiveness of the IEP in provid-
ing a FAPE, and has contradicted the individualized nature of the process
mandated by the Act.
19 7
The Court also aggrandized the procedural safeguards of the Act to the
point that, if they are fulfilled, and the IEP is reasonably calculated to produce
educational benefit, then the reviewing court can consider no more.198 This
emphasis will have the dual effect of forcing schools to abide painstakingly by
the procedures and therefore making educational decisions effectively final af-
ter administrative remedies are exhausted. It will also weaken the negotiating
position of the handicapped child relative to the school's ability to resist imple-
menting the requested services. 199
A question that remains unanswered is how a school's failure to abide by
the procedures set out in the Act will affect the validity of the school's plan. It
188. In Harrell v. Wilson County Schools, 58 N.C. App. 260, 293 S.E.2d 687 (1982), the court
held that although N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-363 (1978) was drafted to bring the state into conform-
ity with the Act, Rowley did not control interpretation of the statute, which had since been rewrit-
ten to express "that the policy of the State is to ensure every child a fair and full opportunity to
reach his full potential." 58 N.C. App. at 264-65 & n.1, 293 S.E.2d at 690 & n.l (quoting N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 115C-106 (Cune. Supp. 1981)).
189. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 110-18 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 119-28 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 97-128 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 80.
194. See supra notes 57-59 & 95 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 170-75 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 129-31 & 178-80 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
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is arguable that if the IEP is reasonably calculated to provide an educational
benefit, a breach of the procedural mechanism becomes insignificant. In light
of the stress the Court laid on those mechanisms, however, such nonadherence
will be difficult for a reviewing court to overlook.2° °
Although Rowley is now controlling law in interpreting the provisions of
P.L. 94-142, it remains to be seen what its full impact will be. It is clear that by
selecting Rowley as its first case to interpret the Act, the Court brought before
itself a relatively sympathetic factual situation. The school system was provid-
ing individualized services, 20 1 and the child was progressing socially and aca-
demically. 202 The question was how much progress is enough, and the Court
used this sympathetic fact pattern to establish a relatively conservative stan-
dard of acceptable benefit. In doing so, the Court may have been, in part,
reacting to considerations outside of the language and history of the Act it-
self.203 It is for Congress now to determine whether Rowley truly reflects the
intentions of P.L. 94-142, for, after Rowley, the hands of the judiciary in con-
struing its provisions are effectively tied.
PHILIP WILLIAM CLEMENTS
200. In reviewing administrative determinations, courts apply the rule of "harmless error,"
and will not reverse a decision for failure to follow a procedural rule if such failure did not seri-
ously prejudice or otherwise injure the party entitled to the protection of the procedural safeguard.
Dodson v. National Transp. Bd., 644 F.2d 647 (7th Cir. 1981). Courts are cautious, however, in
applying the doctrine when basic procedural rights have been implicated. See, e.g., Doe v. Hamp-
ton, 566 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
The question of which rights are "basic" under the Act, and at what point prejudice occurs, is
yet to be answered. Considering that the Supreme Court has raised the procedures of Pub. L. No.
94-142.to a level of being almost substantive requirements of an IEP, it could be contended that
any breach of the procedures interferes with a basic right and causes prejudice to the handicapped
child.
201. See supra text accompanying note 42.
202. See supra text accompanying note 47.
203. See supra notes 148-64 and accompanying text.
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